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As firms increasingly operate and conduct R&D in emerging markets, 'transnational patenting' - patenting of the same
invention across more than one country - is becoming a cornerstone of their intellectual property (IP) strategies. We
investigate whether and how a patent granted to a focal firm's invention in an emerging economy (China) can shape its
subsequent technological knowledge adoption by other firms in developed economies (U.S.). Drawing on research from
market signaling and intellectual property strategy, we address this question using a novel dataset of 4,226 China-U.S.
patent dyads covering 1,104 firms, and matching control sets. Difference-in-differences estimates show that patent
granted to the focal firm's invention under a weak IP institution (China) increases its subsequent knowledge adoption (by
up to 76%) by other firms under a strong IP institution (U.S.). The signaling effect to mitigate information asymmetry is
most salient for patents awarded to China-based firms, in computing and information sector, and to technologies
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Transnational Intellectual Property Strategies and 
Firms’ Knowledge Adoption:  




As firms increasingly conduct R&D in emerging markets, ‘transnational patenting’– 
patenting of the same invention across more than one country– is becoming a cornerstone of 
their intellectual property (IP) strategies. We investigate how patenting of a firm’s invention 
in an emerging economy (China) can shape its subsequent technological knowledge adoption 
by other firms in a developed economy (U.S.). Using 4,226 China-U.S. patent dyads covering 
1,104 firms, our difference-in-differences estimates show that patent grant under a weak IP 
institution (China) increases the technology’s knowledge adoption under a strong IP 
institution (U.S.). Such signaling effect to mitigate information asymmetry is most salient for 
patents awarded to China-based firms, in computing and information sector, and to 
technologies developed in Chinese provinces with lower de facto IP institutional quality. 
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As more firms and organizations operate and conduct R&D in emerging markets, 
‘transnational patenting’ – patenting of the same invention across more than one country – is 
becoming a critical part of their intellectual property (IP) strategies. Transnational patenting 
of the same invention often occurs first in a country where R&D is conducted and 
subsequently in another country of high market potential. Increasingly, the locus of R&D and 
innovative activities has been shifting to the emerging economies such as China as domestic 
start-ups, innovative firms, and multinational corporations (MNCs) develop novel 
technologies and product platforms there to take advantage of the availability of low cost 
technical personnel and proximity to market (Barrett, van Biljon, and Musso, 2011; Zhao, 
2006). These firms and organizations often apply for patents first to protect their inventions 
developed there before doing the same in another major market such as the U.S.  
From 1995 to 2004, the number of U.S. patents awarded to U.S. firms based on 
technologies first developed outside the U.S. in non-OECD countries has more than doubled 
(OECD, 2005). Furthermore, the number of patents in the major science and technology 
classes awarded by the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of the People's Republic of 
China to U.S. firms and organizations conducting R&D in China has increased 468 times 
over a 20 year period from only 5 in 1986 to 2,338 in 2006 (SIPO, 2008). At the same time, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that firms in the U.S. are placing ‘…increased emphasis on 
clearance searching and monitoring, especially before a new product is launched in China’ 
(Lin, 2011) as part of their transnational patenting strategies. Our own conversations with 
R&D managers of MNCs and domestic Chinese firms, their in-house patent lawyers and 
other patent attorneys based in China specializing in procurement, management and 
enforcement of SIPO patents also indicate that firms in the U.S. increasingly commission 
extensive ‘prior art studies’ of SIPO patents issued to firms operating in China (in addition to 
U.S. and European patents) either before filing for a patent application or developing a new 
product to help them plan for their own technology development and patent portfolios.
1
   
                                                 
1
 Several face-to-face semi-structured interviews and phone interviews with managers of U.S. and other foreign 
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Patents fulfill Spence’s (1973) original conceptualization of a signal: there is substantial 
cost involved in securing them through a lengthy application and grant process; and thus they 
provide a mechanism by which the quality of an innovation can be sorted. While some 
scholars argued that patenting is too ‘noisy’ a signal to influence the expectation of public 
investors proxied by the amount of funds raised in initial public offerings (IPOs) (Deeds, 
Decarolis, and Coombs, 1997), others found a significant relationship between patent filing, 
grant and investment. For example, Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) find that biotechnology 
start-ups advertise their patent applications and awards prominently when filing for IPOs. 
Furthermore, those start-ups with more patents go to IPO faster and are worth more when 
they do. Using evidence from IPO offerings, Heeley, Matusik, and Jain (2007) find that 
patents serve an economically meaningful role as signaling devices to public equity investors 
in biopharmaceutical and chemical sectors but not in information technology related sectors.  
Other evidence suggests that patenting activities enable new ventures to secure funding 
on more favorable terms or help them garner preferential access to the ‘extra-financial 
services’ of prominent venture capital investors (Hsu, 2004). In a more recent study, Hsu and 
Ziedonis (2008) find that patents serve as signals to significantly increase investors’ estimates 
of start-up valuations (by more than 28%); with the effect more pronounced in earlier 
financing rounds and when the funds are secured from more prominent investors.  
While these studies support the notion that patents can serve as signals for innovating 
firms to gain financing, resources and reputation, we still lack the conceptual framework and 
empirical evidence on whether and how transnational patents, by acting as a signal in one 
market, can influence technological knowledge processes in another. Specifically, to what 
extent can the patent awarded to a focal firm in an emerging economy with a weak IP regime 
(e.g., China) shape the technology’s adoption by other firms in developed economies with 
strong IP regimes (e.g., the U.S.)? What are the moderating roles of organizational home base, 
technology sector, and R&D location in regions of lower de facto IP institutional quality 
                                                                                                                                                        
based MNCs conducting R&D in China and domestic Chinese firms, their in-house patent lawyers, patent 
attorneys in specialized IP law firms and service providers, and SIPO officials were conducted between March 
2008 to April 2012 in the U.S., Beijing, Shanghai and Singapore. Information was updated through e-mails and 
phone calls in the following months on confidentiality conditions.     
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(such as those Chinese provinces with less robust IP system and greater IP uncertainty) in this 
relationship? These questions have important implications considering the increasingly 
prominent roles of R&D by firms in emerging economies with weak or ineffectual IP regime.  
This study seeks to address these pertinent questions and make the following 
contributions. First, it contributes to the body of research on the strategic and economic value 
of intellectual property right (IPR) to innovating firms (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2008; Heeley et 
al., 2007; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999). Empirical evidence on the impact of 
firm patenting – particularly patenting strategies in the emerging countries – on other firms’ 
knowledge processes is limited and inconclusive. Much prior literature has focused on how 
patenting shapes knowledge production and accumulation in the public domain in developed 
countries (Murray and Stern, 2007; Sorenson and Fleming, 2004). This study sheds light on 
the role of transnational patents as signals to mitigate information asymmetry between focal 
firms developing a novel technology in an emerging economy and other firms observing such 
development in a more developed economy. Furthermore, it contributes new insights into the 
causal linkage between the conferring of a patent right to the focal firm (under the weak IPR 
institution of China) and the strategic responses by other firms in their subsequent 
technological knowledge activities (under the strong IPR institution of the U.S.). We find that 
transnational patents obtained by innovating firms in the emerging economy can influence 
knowledge adoption by other firms in the developed economies. 
Second, this study advances our understanding of the microeconomic foundation for 
technological knowledge growth and accumulation in firms by focusing on their intellectual 
property strategies across national boundaries. While the cumulative nature of scientific and 
technological knowledge has been recognized as central to economic growth (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990) and pertinent to building organizational capabilities (Helfat, 
1997; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000), our understanding of the microeconomic foundation of 
cumulativeness is limited. The mere production of knowledge does not guarantee that others 
will be able to exploit it (Mokyr, 2002). Effective accumulation and use of knowledge require 
awareness of the extant knowledge and the ability to overcome the cost of accessing that 
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knowledge. Recent studies have investigated the effects of research-enhancing organizations 
(Furman and Stern, 2011) and connectedness to external technical sources (Lim, 2009) on 
cumulativeness of knowledge. Nonetheless, prior work offers little guidance for 
understanding the roles of transnational IPRs in fostering knowledge formation and 
accumulation across countries with distinct IP institutional regimes. This study seeks to 
address this gap in the literature. It shows that patents awarded to firms under a weak IP 
institutional regime could influence the cumulativeness of knowledge of other firms under a 
strong IP institutional regime. 
In the next section, we develop our conceptual framework and hypotheses. The ensuing 
section outlines the importance and suitability of using matched China and U.S. patent dyads 
as the empirical setting of this study. We then describe the data, measures and models. This is 
followed by the results and robustness analyses. Finally, we provide the discussion and 
limitations of the study and suggest potential areas for future research. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
The effect of patent grant under weak IPR institutions   
An institution-based view which encompasses institutional conditions and transitions has 
emerged to enrich and shape strategic decisions within organizations (Colyvas and Powell, 
2006; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Scott, 1987, 1995; Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Formally, institutions are defined by economist Douglass North (1990, pp. 3) as ‘the humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction,’ and by sociologist W. Richard Scott 
(1995, pp. 33) as ‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior.’ North’s (1990) conceptualization of formal and 
informal institutions maps to Scott’s (1995) scheme of the three supportive pillars: regulative, 
normative, and cognitive. Our interest lies in regulative institutions and their related laws.  
The protection of private property rights is one the most important aspects of regulative 
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2009; North, 
1991). An examination of technical knowledge adoption and accumulation by firms under 
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one IPR institution in response to market signals originating in another IPR institution 
contributes new insights to the institutional perspective of firm strategy making. In particular, 
transnational patenting by a focal firm under a weak IPR institution could serve as a signal of 
technology potential and market opportunity to mitigate information asymmetry and 
influence knowledge adoption and formation by other firms under a strong IPR institution.        
Patents conform in principle to Spence’s (1973) original conceptualization of a signal – 
they are costly to obtain and, through the government certification process provide a 
mechanism by which the innovative activities can be qualified. By serving as a signal, patents 
provide information that is capable of altering an observer’s probability distribution of 
unobserved variables (Hsu and Zeidonis, 2008; Spence, 1973). Like other predictors of 
quality such as founder background (Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman, 2002; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhaven, 1990) and third party affiliations to the entrepreneurial firm (Gulati and 
Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004), patents can be used by entrepreneurial firms to attract external 
resources by conferring intrinsic value due to property rights (Zott and Huy, 2007), and to 
increase investor estimates of start-up firm value through venture capitalist funding-rounds 
valuation (Hsu and Zeidonis, 2008).   
There is increasing scholarly interest to understand and empirically test the critical roles 
played by patents in bridging the information gap with the resource providers to secure 
venture financing and commercialize unproven technologies in emerging economies such as 
China (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008). Our study focuses on how patents can mitigate the 
information asymmetry under such an economy and affect knowledge adoption in another.  
When firms undertake the patenting procedure, they incur substantial costs in terms of the 
financial and human resources devoted to the application and examination process, and the 
amount of time taken. Depending on if reexamination and deposit of biological materials are 
required, the estimated direct monetary expenses (including attorney fees but excluding 
maintenance fees) for obtaining a typical SIPO invention patent is about CN¥46,000 or 
US$7,300, based on the figures from official government-appointed agency (China Patent 
Trademark Office, 2010). The cost to the firms is lower when securing patents for inventions 
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of higher quality – in terms of relative technical merits or economic value of the technology. 
Higher quality inventions are generally more novel and useful than lower quality inventions 
and thus have greater likelihood of being awarded a patent within a shorter period of time 
(with less reexamination required). The time taken to obtain a patent is an opportunity cost 
that is particularly high for firms which place a premium on speed to market. Thus, while 
firms can apply and be granted patents for both higher and lower quality inventions, firms 
pay less on average to obtain a patent for a higher than a lower quality invention. This is in 
line with the signaling framework (Spence, 1973) which suggests that ‘high-quality types’ 
incur lower cost in sending a signal. Patent signaling is particularly salient in markets where 
IPR institutional condition is inadequate and uncertain (Gans et al., 2008), and information 
asymmetry between the senders – focal firms operating in China – and receivers of the 
signal – other firms in the U.S. – is prevalent (e.g., Chan, Menkveld, and Yang, 2008). 
By serving as a signal, patent awarded to a specific technology under the weak IPR 
institution of China mitigates information asymmetry relative to other technologies developed 
in China. For other firms in the U.S. monitoring and studying relevant prior technologies 
(from China), the China patent provides: (1) an assurance of technology potential for further 
research and commercial development; and (2) a certification of market opportunity as 
strategic bargaining chips for cross-licensing, litigations against IPR infringement or 
establishing IPR territories. In other words, such patent could serve as a positive signal of 
technology potential and market opportunity in China and induce other firms in the U.S. to 
accumulate and further develop the knowledge based on the focal innovation. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1: The grant of a patent to an invention under a weak IPR institution (i.e., 
China) will increase its subsequent technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR 
institution (i.e., U.S.).   
 
The moderating role of organizational home base  
For the next hypothesis, we focus on how the level of information asymmetry between 
the senders and receivers of the signal can affect the salience of the signal. In particular, we 
investigate how pronounced the signaling effect of a patent grant is when the sender is home 
based in China versus home based in the U.S.  
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Firms in the U.S. (i.e., receivers of the signal) may have greater familiarity and better 
understanding of the technological products and characteristics of other U.S.-based MNCs 
(i.e., senders of the signal) conducting R&D in China, relative to other domestic China-based 
firms. Adopting an institutional approach, scholars have argued that firms develop their 
capabilities in relation to their particular environment and thus possess resources that align 
with the specific institutional characteristics of their home country (Kogut, 1993; Thomas and 
Waring, 1999; Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997). The home environment could shape the 
characteristics of the national firms as well as their competitive advantages (Porter, 1990). 
It follows that less information asymmetry exists between firms in the U.S. and those 
U.S.-based MNCs in China, compared to other China-based firms. Firms in the U.S. are 
better able to assess the quality (whether good or bad) of U.S.-based MNCs in China, relative 
to other China-based firms. This information asymmetry could be further reduced if other 
firms in the U.S. have prior knowledge about these U.S.-based MNCs in China through past 
experience or dealings with them. Furthermore, as U.S.-based MNCs in China have more 
established reputation (as perceived by other firms in the U.S.) compared to China-based 
firms, they are seen to be more likely to improve and uphold their reputation in the 
technology market, relative to less well-known Chinese firms. 
Thus, the signaling effect could be higher when a China-based firm obtains a patent in 
China compared to when a U.S.-based firm obtains one. It follows that the award of a SIPO 
patent to a China-based firm, relative to a U.S.-based firm, will have a greater positive effect 
on subsequent knowledge adoption by other firms in the U.S.  
Hypothesis 2: The effect of a patent grant under a weak IPR institution (i.e., China) on 
subsequent technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution (i.e., U.S.) 
will be greater when the patent is awarded to a China-based firm compared to a 
U.S.-based firm. 
 
The moderating role of technology sector 
The remaining hypotheses explore the other boundary conditions in patent signaling 
under the weak IPR institution of China. Specifically, we seek to shed light on the substantive 
versus strategic nature of the signal – in terms of the technology sector to which the invention 
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belongs; and the lucidity of the signal – in terms of the de facto IPR institutional quality of 
the regions where R&D for the patented technology is conducted.  
The nature of the signal could depend on the technology sector to which the patent has 
been awarded. Patents are critical for investment and product development particularly in the 
chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin 
et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986; Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 1981). Technologies in this 
sector can be classified as discrete and not complex (Cohen et al., 2000). While 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms patent a majority of their inventions (Mansfield, 
1986), their patents are fewer in number and greater in substantive and intrinsic value 
compared to, for example, the computing, semiconductor and information sector (von 
Graevenitz, Wagner, and Harhoff, 2011).
2
 Specifically, there are very few patent-holding 
firms for each chemical and biopharmaceutical technology area from 1980 to 2003 (von 
Graevenitz et al., 2011). Each patent in this technology sector can play a substantive role in 
product development, mitigation of the hazards of expropriation by competitors (Gans, Hsu, 
and Stern, 2002) and capturing of market share even under the weak IPR institution of China. 
Thus, the granting of a patent in this sector could serve as a positive signal to reduce 
information asymmetry and increase subsequent technological knowledge adoption by other 
firms in the U.S.  
Hypothesis 3a: The effect of a patent grant under a weak IPR institution (i.e., China) on 
subsequent technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution (i.e., U.S.) 
will be greater when the patent is awarded in the chemical and biotechnology sector. 
 
On the other hand, in the computing, semiconductor and information sector, patents are 
often used for strategic and defensive purposes. This sector is characterized by a diverse set 
of firms performing R&D on potentially overlapping and incremental technological products 
or processes. Firms often obtain patents in this sector in order to use them as cross-licensing 
bargaining chips, to establish their IPR territories, fend off litigation and mitigate potential 
                                                 
2
 For example, a rough comparison between the largest computer company and systems integrator, IBM and the 
largest pharmaceutical company, Pfizer shows that IBM has almost four times the number of granted patents 
(58,261) by USPTO alone until the end of 2008 compared to Pfizer (15,073). On the other hand, IBM and Pfizer 
have similar market capitalization in the fourth quarter of 2008 at U.S. $114.56 billion and U.S. $113.75 billion 
respectively.      
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hold-up problems in the markets for technology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004).  
This sector has also experienced particularly strong growth and innovations over the last 
two decades in the emerging economy of China. With relatively more mature technological 
development and faster product life cycle, competition has become highly intense as more 
firms in this sector are amassing a large number of patents on their core technologies in order 
to strategically leverage them within and outside China (Hu and Jefferson, 2009). For 
example, many Taiwanese computer and integrated circuit manufacturers such as Elan 
Microelectronics and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) have been 
aggressively patenting their core technologies in Taiwan and China to create strong patent 
portfolios. These are used as effective defense against U.S. firms like Agilent Technology and 
Avago Technology in patent infringement lawsuits and as bargaining chips when negotiating 
with these U.S. firms entering the Chinese market down the road (Tsai, 2010). It follows that 
the granting of China patents in this sector could serve as an important signal of strategic 
market potential to mitigate information asymmetry and influence subsequent technological 
knowledge take-up by other firms in the U.S. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of a patent grant under a weak IPR institution (i.e., China) on 
subsequent technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution (i.e., U.S.) 
will be greater when the patent is awarded in the computing and information sector. 
 
The moderating role of R&D location 
The lucidity of the signal afforded by the granting of a patent in China is a function of the 
de facto institutional quality in terms of IPR protection, enforcement and legal systems across 
different geographic regions. Such de facto IPR institutional quality may constitute another 
boundary condition. Even under the generally weak IPR institutional environment of China, 
the level of local (i.e., provincial) protection and enforcement of a patented technology varies 
when a firm researches and develops its technology in a particular location (Fan and Wang, 
2004; Wang, Fan, and Zhu, 2007). For example, the de facto IPR institutional quality is 
higher in the more advanced coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang and Shandong, 
and in the major Chinese municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. These regions 
have a more robust and transparent IPR enforcement and legal systems (Du, Lu, and Tao, 
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2008; World Bank, 2008). The IP courts there are also more responsive and effective in IPR 
dispute resolution and enforcement to protect the IP assets of foreign and domestic firms. 
Furthermore, the IP courts in the municipalities are more separated from and thus less 
influenced by local administrative systems which could present an obstacle to IPR protection.  
On the other hand, in many of the less developed inland western provinces of China such 
as Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Yunnan, the de facto IPR institutional quality is lower 
(Fan, Gillan, and Yu, 2010). The IPR enforcement and legal systems in these regions are less 
transparent and more influenced by the local administrative systems which could present an 
obstacle to IPR protection and enforcement. It follows that there is a higher level of 
uncertainty in the IPR institutional conditions and greater information asymmetry between 
firms in the U.S. and firms conducting R&D on novel technologies in these regions 
(compared to firms in regions of higher IPR institutional quality and more certainty). As a 
result, firms in the U.S. are relatively less able to assess the technology potential and market 
opportunity of the inventions developed by firms in these Chinese regions, all else equal. 
Following the same logic, the signaling effect of a patent grant could be higher when the 
patent is granted to technologies developed by firms in such regions of lower de facto IPR 
institutional quality and of less transparency in their IPR legal system, relative to those 
technologies developed by firms in regions of higher de facto IPR institutional quality and 
greater transparency. Thus, the granting of a patent to technology researched and developed 
by a firm in these regions provides a stronger signal to mitigate information asymmetry for 
the (receiving) firms in the U.S., all else equal. This will have a greater positive effect on 
subsequent adoption of the technology.   
Hypothesis 4: The effect of a patent grant under a weak IPR institution (i.e., China) on 
subsequent technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution (i.e., U.S.) 
will be greater when the patent is awarded to inventions developed by firms in regions of 
lower de facto IPR institutional quality. 
 
Taken together, the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 delineates how under the 
weak IPR institutional environment of China where information asymmetry is high, the 
granting of a patent to the focal firm can serve as a signal of technology potential and market 
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opportunity to induce subsequent knowledge adoption by other firms under the strong IPR 
institutional environment of the U.S. The boundary conditions are also shown in Figure 1.     
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND STRATEGY  
Empirical setting: China-U.S. patent dyads 
After overtaking Germany and Japan, China has become the world’s second largest 
economy in 2010 following the U.S. (International Monetary Fund, 2010). Despite its rapid 
scientific and technological advancement, rising GDP and household income, its IPR regime 
remains less than adequate (Zhao, 2006). However, there is a growing awareness and call for 
stronger IPR protection due to external pressure by foreign firms and organizations on the 
Chinese government and internal pressure from leading domestic technology firms such as 
Lenovo in computing, Huawei in telecommunications and Haier in consumer goods as they 
move up the value chain (Hu and Mathews, 2008; SIPO, 2010). 
While the number of SIPO patents awarded to U.S. firms conducting R&D in China 
continues to climb rapidly (SIPO, 2008), there are also more incidents of patent infringement 
litigations by domestic Chinese firms against firms in major foreign markets such as the U.S. 
For example, domestic Chinese firms like Netacin – a pioneering Chinese firm in flash 
storage technologies – are starting to witness some successes in 2008 in defending their 
patents (on technologies originated and first patented in China) against incumbents like PNY 
in the U.S. Given the increasing emphasis on transnational patenting by firms in China and 
the U.S., China-U.S. patent dyads form a particularly interesting and important setting in our 
understanding of the impact of patent grant under a weak IPR institution like China on the 
technology’s subsequent knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution like the U.S. 
To examine the impact of transnational patenting in the weak IPR institution of China on 
the technology’s knowledge adoption in the strong IPR institution of the U.S., we construct 
and analyze a novel dataset of 4,226 China-U.S. patent dyads, covering 1,104 firms and 
organizations. A China-U.S. patent dyad encapsulates an invention whose patent had been 
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first applied in China and subsequently applied and eventually granted in the U.S.
3
 The 
sample includes the entire population of United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
invention patents applied between 1985 to 2008 for which the same invention patent – known 
as a priority – had been first filed in China. 
A priority right (or right of priority) is a time-limited right, triggered by the first filing of 
an application for a patent (i.e., origin of a technological invention). The priority right 
belongs to the applicant or her successor in title and allows her to file a subsequent patent 
application in another country for the same invention. The applicant can then benefit, for this 
subsequent application, from the date of filing of the first application for the examination of 
certain requirements by the appropriate patent office. When filing the subsequent application, 
the applicant must legally ‘claim the priority’ of the first application in order to make use of 
the right of priority. Thus, the priority right information in a patent can be used to precisely 
and effectively link a China patent with its U.S. counterpart to form a China-U.S. patent dyad. 
The period during which the priority right exists is usually 12 months for patents. The 
timeline illustrating the relationship of a typical China-U.S. patent dyad is shown in Figure 2. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The examination and final granting of a patent in each contracting country is independent 
of the others. While the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) provides a unified procedure for the 
possibility of filing an international application (i.e., a PCT application) in each of its 
contracting countries, it does not provide for a ‘multinational (or international) patent’ (which 
does not exist). This is because the grant of patent is usually a prerogative of each national or 
regional authority (with few exceptions). In other words, the granting of a patent in each 
country is subject to the stringent patent examination procedure administered by individual 
countries. Each country has its own patent review and granting processes and varies to a 
different degree in assessing the patentability bar of novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness. 
                                                 
3
 The sample includes only patents eventually granted in the U.S. to control for the ‘quality’ of the invention 
and to mitigate underlying heterogeneity. This approach is consistent with previous literature (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson, 1993; Murray and Stern, 2007). 
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For example, USPTO patent approval rate has dropped from about 72 percent in 2000 to 44 
percent in 2008 (Wild, 2008) and SIPO has an average approval rate of about 44 percent for 
invention patents from 1985 to 2007 (SIPO, 2008). A firm may choose to patent in individual 
countries and not go through the PCT route in securing patents in another country. 
Thus, due to the mandatory filing, examination and local enforcement of patents in each 
country, China-U.S. patent dyads provide a unique setting for us to exploit the differences in 
the timing of patent application and grant in China and in the U.S., and to shed light on our 
research questions.  
 
Empirical strategy 
To analyze the impact of the granting of a China patent to an invention on its follow-on 
technological knowledge adoption by other non-focal firms in the U.S., we rely on a number 
of methodological and econometric advances. First, we rely on forward citations (excluding 
firm self-citations) to the focal U.S. patent as a proxy for follow-on technological knowledge 
adoption by other firms (in the U.S.). Patent citations provide an inference on how 
subsequent firms and organizations have used and built upon the technological knowledge 
captured in the focal patent. As patent citations embody legal implications in property rights, 
firms and organizations, especially the non-focal ones, are conservative about which patents 
to cite. Usually only patented inventions upon which subsequent inventions directly build are 
being cited. Admittedly, citations are not perfect in measuring knowledge adoption. For 
example, they are often added for reasons such as avoiding litigation or clarifying claims, and 
many are in fact added by patent examiners rather than the inventors themselves. Despite this, 
scholars have shown that they correlate well with actual knowledge adoption and 
accumulation, especially when employing large samples (Duguet and MacGarvie, 2005; Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, 2002). A concern could be the potential bias created by examiner-added 
citations (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006). However, since inventors may have strategic 
motives for omitting certain citations, including examiner-added citations might actually be 
desirable (Lampe, 2012). While incorporating a robustness check using just inventor-added 
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citations (i.e., non-examiner-added citations) is desirable, such data is not available for much 
of the time period of this study. Regression analysis based on the data with available 
examiner-added citations since 2001 suggest that using only inventor-added citations yields 
qualitatively similar results as using both inventor-added and examiner-added citations. 
Second, we employ the difference-in-differences identification methodology (e.g., 
Murray and Stern, 2007; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008) to examine inter-firm technological 
knowledge adoption. To do this, we first calculate the inter-firm citations to the focal set of 
U.S. patents in the China-U.S. patent dyads, relative to the control set of U.S. patents not 
associated with a China patent. This identification approach compares the difference in the 
rate of knowledge adoption in the U.S. before and after the granting of the China patent based 
on the invention originated in China to other inventions from China, relative to the 
knowledge growth trajectory of ‘similar’ inventions not originated in China. The latter is 
captured by a control set of 4,226 ‘similar’ patents with the same technology classes and 
application year but not originated in China. In fact, patented inventions in the control set 
predominantly (more than 92%) originated in the U.S. Each control patent is uniquely 
matched to a focal patent. As illustrated in Figure 3, this identification strategy exploits for 
each China-U.S. patent dyad: (1) the differences in the timing of patent application and grant 
respectively in China and U.S.; and (2) the variation in the timing of patent grant over a focal 
firm’s invention in China as an exogenous ‘shock’ to other non-focal (external) firms in the 
U.S.
4
 As such, this methodology provides a more precise estimate of: (1) the causal effect of 
patent grant in China after patents (on the same invention) have been applied in China and the 
U.S.; (2) the temporal effect of patent grant by observing changes in citation rates over time 
compared to conventional cross-sectional data approaches (Singh and Agrawal, 2011). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
                                                 
4
 In theory, only the first level of comparison is required for the difference-in-differences estimate (Murray and 
Stern, 2007; Huang and Murray, 2009) as it already provides the ‘control set’ which is forward citations in the 
patent-years before the China patent grant (of the focal USPTO patents associated with a China patent dyad). 
This is arguably a superior control to the sample of ‘similar’ USPTO patents that are never associated with a 
China patent dyad. However, including the control set of USPTO patents in the same technology classes and 
application year serves as an additional level of comparison with ‘similar’ inventions not originated in China.   
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DATA, MEASURES AND MODELS 
Overview of data and sources 
To analyze the impact of patent grant under the weak IPR institution of China on 
knowledge adoption under the strong IPR institution of the U.S., we develop a novel data set 
of 4,226 China-U.S. patent dyads, covering 1104 unique firms and organizations. This data 
set was constructed using the following procedure. As our focus is on technologies that are 
developed (or ‘originated’) in China and subsequently introduced to the U.S., we collected 
the entire population of granted USPTO invention patents with China priority until the end of 
2008. Next, as a stringent criterion to ensure consistency in the country of originating patent 
application (which may affect the nature of patent filed), we include only patents that are first 
filed in China and subsequently in the U.S. – i.e., the SIPO patent application date must fall 
before (or on) the application date of its USPTO patent counterpart, matched using priority 
information.
5
 This yielded 4,226 China-U.S. patent dyads where the U.S. patents had been 
applied and granted and the matching China patents had been applied and mostly granted.  
To provide an additional layer of comparison of the rate of knowledge adoption with 
‘similar’ technologies not originated in China, we construct a control set of 4,226 ‘similar’ 
U.S. patents to the 4,226 focal U.S. patents in the China-U.S. patent dyads. Consistent with 
previous studies (Jaffe et al., 1993; Singh and Agrawal, 2011), each control U.S. patent must 
be uniquely matched to a focal U.S. patent with the same three-digit technology classes and 
patent application year but must not be associated with a China priority patent.
6
   
Based on the data set of 4,226 China-U.S. patent dyads and 4,226 control U.S. patents, we 
construct different variables to capture patent ownership and inventor characteristics, 
technology sectors, R&D location, as well as firm-level characteristics for each firm assigned 
a patent. Table 1 summarized the means, standard deviations, definitions and sources of these 
variables. Table 2 presents their correlations. Table 3 compares the descriptive statistics of 
                                                 
5
 Also consistent with previous studies (e.g., Hu and Mathews, 2008; Huang, 2010), we exclude patents from 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as these regions are not considered part of domestic China because of the 
intrinsic differences in their historical and technological developments, patent filing, and reporting systems. 
6
 In fact, about 92 percent of the control U.S. patents (3,876 out of 4,226) claim technologies that originated in 
the U.S. based on priority information. Please also see construction and analyses of additional control sets 3 to 7 
under the section on ‘robustness analyses and additional control sets’.   
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the focal patents – U.S. patents each with a matching China patent dyad by priority – with 
that of the control patents – similar U.S. patents not associated with any China patent. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
We utilize the following major data sources to construct the data: (1) Data for the focal 
and control U.S. patents and citations are derived from the USPTO. (2) Data for the focal 
China patents and citations are obtained from the SIPO. (3) Data for the level of patent 
enforcement and dispute in each Chinese province are obtained from the SIPO Annual 
Reports (2000 to 2008). (4) Firm and organization characteristics are gathered from 
Compustat, USPTO and SIPO, supplemented by various industry publications, news articles 
and information on firm websites. These variables are then manually double checked and 
when in doubt, cross-referenced to company annual reports and news articles online. (5) The 
classification of strong and weak IPR countries, which remains reasonably stable over time, 
is based on the table of ‘institutional environment and country classification’ from Zhao 
(2006). It is compiled from eight key indices from general legal and political environment, 
IPR protection to rule of law and privacy, as shown in Table 4. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
Constructing measures 
Citation-year characteristics  
The dependent variable is annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation. It 
measures the yearly citations to a given U.S. patent excluding those made by the focal firm or 
organization awarded the U.S. patent.
7
 It begins in the year the U.S. patent was applied for 
(earliest is 1985) and continues until 2008. This dependent variable captures follow-on 
knowledge adoption by non-focal firms and organizations. The total number of citation-year 
                                                 
7
 Two additional variations of the dependent variable, annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation are 
constructed. The first one, annual forward citation captures annual forward citations to the given U.S. patent 
made by follow-on patents from both focal and non-focal firms and organizations. The second one, annual 
forward citation excluding inventor self-citation, captures the annual forward citations to a given U.S. patent 
excluding citations made by any of the focal inventors listed on the U.S. patent. Using these two variations of 
dependent variable in the regression models yielded similar results. 
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observations is 66,268. By the end of the period, the average U.S. patent has accumulated 
over its lifetime close to 6 citations excluding focal organization self-citations as measured by 
the total forward citation excluding firm self-citation for each patent. The U.S. patent citation 
year measures the calendar year in which a given citation is made. 
 
China patent characteristics  
The following variables are constructed to ascertain the temporal impact of a China patent 
grant and characteristics of the patent. The explanatory variable is China patent in force – a 
dummy variable equal to one for all years after the China patent is granted and zero prior to 
the patent grant. The mean of China patent in force is 0.26, suggesting that more than a 
quarter of the citation-year observation is distributed in the years when patents are in 
operation. China grant year window is another dummy variable which is coded one when the 
citation is received during the year the China patent is granted (i.e., the ‘window’) and zero 
otherwise. These two variables are derived from China patent application year and China 
patent grant year. We also construct China patent grant lag to denote the number of years 
between a China patent application and grant, and China-U.S. patent lag to denote the 
number of years between a U.S. patent application and its matching China patent dyad grant. 
 
U.S. patent characteristics  
The focal U.S. patents (of the China-U.S. patent dyads) and the control U.S. patents are 
characterized by the following variables. Matching China patent dyad (of the China-U.S. 
patent dyads) is a dummy variable set to 1 if the U.S. patent is associated with a matching 
China patent dyad. When this dummy variable equals zero, the U.S. patent is part of the 
control patent set. U.S. patent in force is a dummy variable equal to one for all years after the 
U.S. patent is granted and zero prior to the patent grant. U.S. grant year window is a dummy 
variable which is coded one when the citation is received during the year the U.S. patent is 
granted and zero otherwise. U.S. patent application year is the year in which the U.S. patent 
is filed. U.S. patent grant year is the year when the U.S. patent is awarded by the USPTO.  
Number of inventors counts the number of inventors on the U.S. patent. Number of 
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classes counts the number of national patent classes in the U.S. patent and provides a proxy 
for patent scope (Lerner, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991). Number of claims denotes the number of 
legal claims made by the U.S. patent and provides a proxy for patent strength (Harhoff and 
Reitzig, 2004; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). Number of patents in patent family counts 
the number of unique patents contained in the international patent family of the U.S. patent. 
Number of countries in patent family counts the number of unique countries represented by 
the patents in the international patent family of the U.S. patent. Together, these two variables 
provide the international scope of the patent protection.  
Biochemical sector is a dummy variable that denotes if the patent belongs to chemical, 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology related classes. Computing and information sector is a 
dummy variable that denotes if the patent belongs to computing or information storage 
related classes. R&D location in weak IPR provinces is a dummy variable that denotes if the 
patented technology is researched and developed in one of the eight Chinese provinces in the 
first quartile (lowest 25 percent) in IPR protection and enforcement: Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Hainan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Building on prior research (Fan et al., 
2010), we derived this measure from the average number of patent enforcement and dispute 




Firm and organization characteristics  
Using Compustat database, company annual reports, websites, and secondary data from 
various sources, we construct a series of variables to capture the firm- or organization-level 
characteristics for the 1,104 unique firms and organizations in the sample. First, we construct 
a series of dummy variables to ascertain the type of entity to which the patent is awarded. 
Firm denotes for-profit company or registered business entity. University denotes university, 
college or tertiary educational institution. Research institute denotes non-profit research 
institute, organization or national laboratory. Hospital denotes hospital, clinic or health care 
                                                 
8
 The data obtained from SIPO Annual Reports is available starting from year 2000. The eight provinces 
selected are among the lowest 25 percent in the level of IPR enforcement and protection. Analyses using 
alternative cut-offs for provinces in the lowest 20 or 30 percent yield similar results and consistent findings.   
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facilities. Government denotes central or state government agency, bureau, ministry, army, 
administration or council. Individual denotes individual owning the patent.  
Second, to ascertain the home base of the firm or organization to which the patent is 
assigned, we construct the following variables. Based in China denotes if the assignee firm 
originates from or is home based in China. Based in U.S. denotes if the assignee firm 
originates from or is home based in the U.S. 
Third, we construct total assets (mean = US$21.7 billion) and total sales (mean = 
US$32.3 billion) to denote the total cumulative assets (until the year of focal patent grant) 
and total sales (in the year of focal patent grant) for all publicly traded firms owning the focal 
patent respectively. The means reflect the large size and amount of assets of these firms. We 
also construct variables to proxy organizational research and innovative capabilities. R&D 
spending captures the total R&D expenditure of the (publicly traded) firm in the year of the 
focal patent grant. Total number of patents is the total number of patents of the organization 
which owns the focal patent over the organization’s lifetime (i.e., to the end of 2008 when the 
sampling period ended). Number of patents denotes the cumulative number of patents of the 
organization which owns the focal patent until the end of the year of the focal patent grant. 
The high mean values of R&D spending (mean = US$0.93 billion), total number of patents 
(mean = 2,498) and number of patents (mean = 1,529) suggest that the firms and 
organizations in the sample are innovative with strong R&D capabilities and resources. 
Finally, we construct variables to denote if the patented invention (of the focal firm) is 
developed in countries with weak IPR institutional regime like China or India or in countries 
with strong IPR institutional regime like the U.S. or Japan. Table 4 lists the strong versus 
weak IPR countries which remain reasonably stable over time (Zhao, 2006). Developed 
China IPR weak denotes if half or more of the U.S. patent inventors are based in China which 
indicates the invention is developed in China. Developed U.S. IPR strong denotes if half or 
more of the U.S. patent inventors are based in the U.S. Developed non-U.S. IPR strong 
denotes if half or more of the focal U.S. patent inventors are based in non-U.S., strong IPR 
countries such as U.K. or Japan. Developed non-U.S. IPR weak denotes if half or more of the 
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focal U.S. patent inventors are based in non-U.S., weak IPR countries including China. 
 
Model specifications 
To more precisely ascertain the main effect of patent grant in China on technological 
knowledge adoption in the U.S., and the moderating roles of organizational home base, 
technology sector, and R&D location, we use the difference-in-differences identification 
approach (Furman and Stern, 2011; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). This is achieved by 
comparing the difference in citations to focal U.S. patents – as the measure of technological 
knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution – in the pre- versus post- China patent 
grant period for those citations affected by the patent grant to the same difference for 
unaffected citations, relative to citations to ‘similar’ control U.S. patents. 
We use annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation to the U.S. patent by 
follow-on firms and organizations in the sample as the dependent variable. As this is a highly 
right-skewed count variable that takes on non-negative integer values, we use a nonlinear 
regression approach to avoid heteroskedastic, non-normal residuals (Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches, 1984). There are two ways to deal with the discrete nature of such count data: the 
Poisson regression model (PRM) or the negative binomial regression model (NBRM), a 
generalized form of the Poisson regression (Hausman et al., 1984). As Allison and Waterman 
(2002) point out that the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model is not a true 
fixed-effects model since it fails to control for all of its predictors, we use fixed-effects 
Poisson model based on Wooldridge (1999). The fixed-effects Poisson estimator produces 
consistent estimates of the parameters in an unobserved components multiplicative panel data 
model under very general conditions and provides a consistent estimate of the conditional 
mean function even if the variances are misspecified (Wooldridge, 1999). As an additional 
verification, we employed fixed-effects negative binomial regression models with robust 
standard errors which yielded similar results. We also incorporate robust standard errors in 
the fixed-effects Poisson models (Simcoe, 2007) based on Wooldridge (1999), using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator (Allison and Waterman, 2002; Greene, 2004) in all models 
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to account for possible heteroscedasticity and lack of normality in the error terms. 
In the difference-in-differences regression model given in Equation (1), the dependent 
variable is annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation which measures the extent of 
subsequent knowledge adoption of the focal technology. As we are interested in whether the 
granting of the China patent dyad affects subsequent knowledge adoption, we include the 
main explanatory variable, China patent in force, in the selection and marginal effects 
equation (1). We also include the variable China grant year window to account for the 
possibility that in the actual grant year of the China patent, the impact of IPR may be noisy. 
In addition, we control for other observable characteristics of the patents in equation (1): 
FCi,t = f (εi,t; αChina_grant_year_windowi,t + βChina_patent_in_forcei,t  
+ γmatching_China_patent_dyadi + δnumber_of_inventorsi + δfirmi + εuniversityi  
+ λresearch_institutei + μhospitali + νgovernmenti +ξnumber_of_classesi  
+ ζnumber_of_claimsi + ρnumber_of_patents_in_patent_familyi  
+ ςnumber_of_countries_in_patent_familyi + ηUS_grant_year_windowi,t  
+ θUS_patent_in_forcei,t)            (1)  
From equation (1), we develop the most stringent model to include both patent fixed 
effects and patent citation year fixed effects as shown in equation (2). The former controls for 
any underlying variations across each U.S. patent. The latter controls for any unobserved 
heterogeneity in each year when the forward citation is received by the patent.  
FCi,t = f (εi,t; αChina_grant_year_windowi,t + βChina_patent_in_forcei,t  
+ χpatent fixed effectsi + ψcitation_year fixed effectst)      (2) 
In both equations, we can test whether the citation rate to the U.S. patent changes after the 
China patent dyad is granted, accounting for fixed differences in the citation rate across 
different patent dyads with different observable characteristics and over time. Using these 
two models to evaluate the effects of China patent grant, we then examine how organizational 
home base, technology sector and R&D location can respectively interact with China patent 
grant to affect subsequent technological knowledge adoption. This is given by equation (3): 
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FCi,t = f (εi,t; αChina_grant_year_windowi,t + βChina_patent_in_forcei,t  
+ χpatent fixed effectsi + ψcitation_year fixed effectst  
+ πpatent_firm_base_interactionsi,t + γpatent_technology_sector_interactionsi,t 
+ωpatent_R&D_location _interactionsi,t)        (3) 
 
RESULTS 
Main effects of China patent grant  
Models 5-1 to 5-4 in Table 5 investigate the baseline, selection, marginal and main effects 
of China patent grant on annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation of the U.S. 
patent dyads. We start with the ordinary least regression (OLS) model shown in Model 5-1, 
where the dependent variable is equal to the natural log of annual forward citation excluding 
firm self-citation plus one. While OLS provides a simpler interpretation of the result, it does 
not account for the skewed nature of the count data. The effect of the granting of China patent 
(China patent in force) is positive but not significant.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
This is followed by the Poisson model specifications described before, as shown in 
Models 5-2 to 5-4. For ease of interpretation, the coefficients are reported as incidence rate 
ratios (IRR) from Model 5-2 onwards.
9
 Model 5-2 is the baseline model with controls for the 
number of inventors; whether the organization assigned the patent is a firm, university, 
research institute, hospital or government agency; the number of patent classes and claims; 
the number of unique patents and countries in the patent family; and U.S. grant year window 
and U.S. patent in force. Model 5-2 shows a positive and significant effect on knowledge 
adoption when the entity awarded the China patent is a hospital (67%), with increasing 
number of patent classes (4%) and claims (1%), and after the U.S. patent has been granted 
                                                 
9
 In Tables 5 and 6, we report the coefficients as incidence rate ratios (IRR) in all models except those in the 
OLS Model 5-1. IRR can be derived by exponentiating the coefficients, βk of the independent variable xk of the 
Poisson regression models. In this case, the IRR can be interpreted as the factor change in annual citations 
received in a given year due to a unit increase in the regressor. To illustrate, an IRR of 1.14 in the coefficient 
indicates a 14 percent increase in the dependent variable for a unit increase in the independent variable. An IRR 
of 0.49 indicates a 51 percent decrease in the dependent variable for a unit increase in the independent variable.  
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(275%). The effect is positive but not significant when the patent assignee is a firm (2%). On 
the other hand, there is a negative and significant impact when the patent assignee is a 
research institute (-31%) or government agency (-45%). The number of patents in patent 
family and the number of countries in patent family have no effects. 
Model 5-3 is the selection and marginal effects model with controls. This model includes 
China grant year window, China patent in force and China patent dyad along with the same 
controls specified in Model 5-2, as well as patent citation year fixed effects. Model 5-3 
provides a first test of hypothesis 1. The result shows that the granting of the China patent 
(China patent in force), by serving as a signal under the weak IPR institution of China, 
increases follow-on technological knowledge adoption under the strong IPR institution of the 
U.S. by about 17 percent (significant at 1%). The magnitude of the effects and significance of 
the control variables here are in line with those in Model 5-2. By including Matching China 
patent dyad in Model 5-3, it allows us to estimate the difference between U.S. patent 
associated with a granted China patent (i.e., technologies that originated in China) and U.S. 
patents not associated with a granted China patent, in terms of follow-on knowledge adoption. 
This selection effect suggests that U.S. patents associated with patented technologies from 
China (China patent dyad) are 51 percent less well cited cumulatively (significant at 1%) by 
other (non-focal) firms in the U.S. relative to U.S. patents not associated with China patent. 
This finding is supported by the result from the most stringent specifications in Model 5-4 
which includes China grant year window, China patent in force, patent fixed effects and 
patent citation year fixed effects. It suggests the granting of the China patent to a focal firm 
increases the follow-on citations to its U.S. patent dyad by other firms by about 11 percent 
(significant at 1%). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Figure 4 displays the coefficients using the specifications in Model 5-4 for both the 
fixed-effects Poisson regression and the fixed-effects negative binomial regression. It shows 
the estimated temporal impact of China patent grant on follow-on citations for each year 
preceding and following the patent grant date. Patent grant in China has a positive and 
significant effect on follow-on citations in both models but the effect tapers off over time.  




Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
As a further validation, using the subsample of focal U.S. patents with matching China 
patent dyads, we estimate in Models 5-5 and 5-6 the impact of China patent grant based only 
on the difference in time lapsed between the application of the U.S. patent and the granting of 
its China patent dyad for each U.S. patent. This estimation excludes the control set of U.S. 
patents not associated with any China patent. Models 5-5 and 5-6 show the granting of the 
China patent dyad increases subsequent technological knowledge adoption in the U.S. by 26 
percent and 76 percent respectively (both significant at 1%). This is consistent with the 
results from Models 5-3 and 5-4 and lends further support to Hypothesis 1. 
 
Salience of the signal: Moderating effects of organizational home base  
Using interaction variables, Models 6-1 to 6-3 in Table 6 shed light on the moderating 
effects of organizational home base under information asymmetry. Model 6-1 indicates that 
the signaling effect of China patent grant is more salient when the firm is based in China as 
shown by a 46 percent increase in forward citation rate (significant at 1%) compared to a 
non-significant 6 percent decrease when the firm is not based in China. Model 6-2 shows a 17 
percent decrease (significant at 1%) in forward citation rate when the firm is based in U.S. 
versus a 19 percent increase (significant at 1%) when the firm is not based in U.S. The 
difference is statistically significant. Finally, Model 6-3 confirms the results from the 
previous two models and shows a 46 percent increase (significant at 1%) for China-based 
firms versus a 17 percent decrease (significant at 1%) for U.S.-based firms. The difference of 
63 percent is statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.     
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
Nature of the signal: Moderating effects of technology sector  
 Models 6-4 investigates the impact when the patent is awarded in the biochemical sector 
as patents in this technology sector have substantive and intrinsic value and play an 
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indispensable role in product development and revenue generation. In this model, we 
compare the interaction effects between China patent in force and biochemical sector with 
that of China patent in force and non-biochemical sector. Surprisingly, the interaction with 
non-biochemical sector yields a 15 percent increase (significant at 1%) compared to the 
non-significant interaction effect of biochemical sector. Hypothesis 3a is not supported.   
Patents in the computing and information sector are often used for strategic and 
defensive purposes. In Model 6-5, we compared the interaction effects between China patent 
in force and computing and information sector with that of China patent in force and 
non-computing and information sector. Having a patent granted in the computing and 
information sector shows a 58 percent increase (significant at 10%) versus a modest 10 
percent increase (significant at 1%) for non-computing and information sector interaction. 
The difference of 48 percent is statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is supported. 
 
Lucidity of the signal: Moderating effects of R&D location  
Finally, Model 6-6 in Table 6 investigates the impact of China patent grant to an 
invention which is researched and developed in one of the eight Chinese provinces in the first 
quartile (lowest 25%) in IPR protection and enforcement. Here, we compare the interaction 
effects between China patent in force and R&D location in weak IPR provinces with that of 
China patent in force and R&D location not in weak IPR provinces. There is a 52 percent 
increase (significant at 10%) on follow-on knowledge adoption when the patent is granted to 
the invention researched and developed in a weak IPR province compared to a 10 percent 
increase (significant at 5%) when the invention is not researched and developed there. The 
difference of 42 percent is statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 
Robustness analyses and additional control sets 
As a robustness check to verify the main results, we employ negative binomial regression 
models (with robust standard errors) which account for over-dispersion when the conditional 
variance is significantly greater than the conditional mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986, 
1998). The negative binomial regression models yielded similar results to those of the 
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Poisson regression models (also see Figure 4). To test for citations by both focal and 
non-focal firms, and then by other non-focal inventors, we replaced the dependent variable, 
annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation, firstly with annual forward citation and 
then with annual forward citation excluding inventor self-citation in these models. The 
results are similar to that of the original models. Knowledge adoption is equally salient by 
focal and non-focal firms, and by non-focal inventors. To insulate the results against the 
possibility that the interaction effects in a non-linear model are not the same as their 
cross-partial derivatives (Ai and Norton, 2001), we performed additional regressions similar 
to Model 5-4 on split samples for Models 6-1 to 6-6 respectively. For example for Model 6-1, 
we performed regressions using data subsamples for based in China and not based in China 
separately. Results from these split sample analyses are consistent with the main findings. 
To control for any unobserved heterogeneity across each firm, in Models 5-4 and 5-6 we 
substitute the most stringent patent fixed effects (which control for any unobserved 
heterogeneity across each U.S. patent) with firm fixed effects (which control for any potential 
underlying variation across each firm and organization). The results obtained are similar and 
consistent with the main findings. Another potential concern is that the increase in follow-on 
citations to focal U.S. patents after China patent dyad grant could be due to the natural 
increase in citations, which typically occurs in the first one to two years after U.S. patent 
grant. While the difference-in-differences estimation approach can already take into account 
of the effect of China patent grant on citations to U.S. patent for each year after the China 
patent grant for the entire sample (e.g., see Figure 4), we further assuage this concern by 
performing additional checks using Models 5-2 to 5-6 on the subsamples of patents in which 
China patent grant occurs two, three and four years after the U.S. patent grant year 
respectively when citations to a U.S. patent typically start to decline. These subsamples of 
patents all have citations to the U.S. patent dyad prior to China patent grant. The results 
remained strong and consistent with the main findings. Together, these provide robust 
support for the main results obtained using fixed-effects Poisson regression models. 
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To alleviate concern that the effects could arise due to a difference in technological origin 
(i.e., priority country) or subsequent patenting countries (i.e., patent family), we carefully 
constructed five more matching control sets to the focal China-U.S. patent dyads (set 1) and 
the original control set (set 2). These additional control sets (3 to 7) are respectively matched 
to sets 1 and 2 based on the same patent technology classes and application year. Control set 
3 contains 502 matching patents that have a non-U.S. strong IPR priority country and are 
subsequently patented in the U.S. These patents must have patent family from the same 
non-U.S. strong IPR country and the U.S. only. Control set 4 contains 443 matching patents 
that have a non-China weak IPR priority country and are subsequently patented in the U.S. 
These patents must have patent family from the same non-China weak IPR country and the 
U.S. only. Control set 5 contains 385 matching patents with the U.S. as the priority country, 
and patent family from the U.S. and a non-U.S. strong IPR country only. This suggests that 
the technology claimed in the patent originates in the U.S. but is later patented in a non-U.S. 
strong IPR country. Control set 6 contains 270 matching patents with the U.S. as the priority 
country, and patent family from the U.S. and China only. This suggests that the technology 
claimed in the patent originates in the U.S. but is later patented in China. Control set 7 
contains 147 matching patents with the U.S. as the priority country and patent family from 
the U.S. and a non-China weak IPR country. This suggests that the technology claimed in the 
patent originates in the U.S. but is later patented in a non-China weak IPR country.
10
              
First, we analyze the focal set with matching control sets 3 and 4 respectively using 
regression models similar to Models 5-2 to 5-4. Comparing results from sets 2 to 4, we find 
that the main effects of patent grant in China remain strong whether the priority country is the 
U.S. (set 2), a non-U.S. strong IPR country (set 3), or a non-China weak IPR country (set 4). 
Next, we analyze the focal set to the matching control sets 5 to 7 respectively. Control patents 
in sets 5 to 7 must have the U.S. as priority country. We find consistently strong effects of 
China patent grant (over technology originating in China), relative to technology originating 
                                                 
10
 The number of matching control patents differs from sets 3 to 7 because each set contains all possible patents 
that fulfill the criteria imposed on its construction. Loosening the criteria to obtain a higher number of control 
patents (especially for sets 6 and 7) yielded similar and consistent results in the regression models. 
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in the U.S. (i.e., with U.S. priority) whether or not it is later patented in a non-U.S. strong IPR 
country (set 5), China (set 6), or a non-China weak IPR country (set 7). The effect is also not 
due to the number of times a technology is later patented in different IPR countries.
11
 Overall, 
the results of our study are robust to a number of alternate specifications and samples. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While the institution of property right regime in many emerging economies such as China 
remains far from adequate, R&D and patenting of innovative technologies by domestic 
start-ups or MNCs in these markets have become the cornerstone of their intellectual property 
strategy. These firms usually patent in another country of high market potential such as the 
U.S. later on and increasingly engage in transnational patenting across countries to better 
safeguard their innovations across multiple markets. Surprisingly, we know little about the 
dynamics and impact of the granting of a patent under a weak IPR institution on 
technological knowledge adoption under a strong IPR institution. Drawing on research from 
market signaling and intellectual property strategy, this study provides the first large-scale 
systematic evidence of the positive effects of patenting by a focal firm under the weak IPR 
institution of China on subsequent knowledge adoption by other firms under the strong IPR 
institution of the U.S. It demonstrates that under the weak IPR environment of China where 
information asymmetry is high, obtaining a patent could send a signal to positively shape 
subsequent knowledge adoption and formation under the strong IPR environment of the U.S. 
This finding is pertinent to policy makers and managers given that technological information 
conveyed by firms in an emerging market could be ‘noisy’ and difficult to verify.       
The signaling effect is more salient for patents awarded to China-based firms than to 
U.S.-based firms conducting R&D in China due to the presence of a higher level of 
information asymmetry between the China-based firms and other firms in the U.S, all else 
equal. The signaling effect is largely restricted to the computing and information storage 
sector. In this sector, patents are often sought for defensive and strategic purposes which 
                                                 
11
 Detailed descriptive statistics and regression result for each matching control set is available upon request. 
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could suggest a greater role for signaling. There is no significant effect for the biochemical 
sector where there are fewer patents and each patent has distinct and substantive value. The 
signaling effect is more pronounced when the technology is developed in the less advanced 
(and predominantly western) inland Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Shanxi, Hainan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou, where the de facto IPR institutional quality 
is lower, IPR legal system is less transparent and information asymmetry is higher.      
These findings have important public policy implications. They highlight the notion that 
policy decisions affecting the IPR institutional quality in a country (or a region) are 
intrinsically linked to the knowledge activities in another. As such, government policies 
aimed at enhancing IPR protection and enforcement in one geographic region or institutional 
environment can reduce information asymmetry and influence knowledge adoption in another. 
To the extent that such mechanism may create a positive and self-reinforcing feedback loop 
to encourage subsequent knowledge accumulation and innovation, it may benefit firms 
conducting R&D in emerging economies like China as they increasingly engage in the 
production of knowledge and ‘indigenous’ innovation despite its inadequate IPR regime.     
These findings also have strategic and managerial implications for innovating and 
entrepreneurial firms that produce, integrate and assimilate technological knowledge across 
national and geographic boundaries. Cumulative knowledge is an important strategic asset 
that provides options for long-term exploration and expansion into new and uncertain 
external markets (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Managers and decision-makers should appreciate 
the role of transnational patenting as a critical part of their IP strategies. Patenting a 
technology in an emerging economy associated with a high level of information asymmetry 
can influence its adoption by other firms in more developed economies. Specifically, 
organizational home base, technology sector and R&D location can shape subsequent use and 
accumulation of knowledge and innovation in another market. These are important strategic 
choices that should be carefully evaluated by innovating firms in view of their expanding 
global reach and increasing complexity of R&D operations in the emerging markets. 
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Limitations and future research 
While this study deepens our understanding of the impact of transnational patenting 
strategies under the weak IPR institution of China on knowledge adoption and formation by 
other firms under the strong IPR institution of the U.S., it has a number of limitations. One 
limitation is that the present study only focuses on technological knowledge encoded in 
patents and does not examine non-codified knowledge. To the extent that inventions kept as 
industrial secrets contribute little to the stock of codified knowledge that can be more readily 
transferred and built upon by other firms and organizations, patent citations represent a useful 
indicator of future technological knowledge adoption and use. Nevertheless, examining the 
effect of patenting under one IPR institution on the accumulation of non-codified knowledge 
under another is a potentially important area for future research.     
Another limitation is that this study only examines the effect of patent grant in China on 
the technology’s subsequent knowledge adoption in the U.S. using citations to USPTO 
patents. As citations to SIPO patents are not mandatory and therefore incomplete, 
understanding the flow and accumulation of technological knowledge within China is 
confronted by such methodological constraint. However, as our focus is on knowledge 
adoption by firms in the U.S., citations to USPTO patents function as an appropriate proxy. 
Nevertheless, future research could look into the conceptual and empirical differences 
between USPTO and SIPO patent citations such as the level of completeness and motivation 
behind SIPO citations, and how well they trace knowledge accumulation in China.  
Furthermore, this study focuses only on two countries – U.S. and China. While these are 
the world’s two largest economies with contrasting IPR institutions and represent 
considerable policy and managerial interests for different key stakeholders, future work could 
extend the analyses to more countries to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics and 
impact of transnational patenting strategies on firms’ knowledge processes in those countries. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and definitions of variables 
Citation-Year Characteristics 
Variable Mean S.D. Definition Source 
Annual forward 
citation excluding firm 
self-citation  
0.44 1.40 Yearly forward citations: citations to a given U.S. 
patent except those made by the focal firm or 
organization awarded the U.S. patent 
USPTO 
Total forward citation 
excluding firm 
self-citation 
5.70 13.55 Total number of forward citations (except those made 
by the focal firm or organization) accruing to a U.S. 
patent over its lifetime (1984 to 2008) 
USPTO 
U.S. patent citation 
year 
2003 4.37 The year in which the forward citation is received by 
the U.S. patent 
USPTO 
China Patent Characteristics 
China patent in force 0.26 0.44 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if citation is received in 
years after the China patent grant year 
SIPO 
China grant year 
window 
0.04 0.20 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if citation is received in 




2000 5.05 The year in which the China patent application is 
made 
SIPO 
China patent grant 
year* 
2002 4.57 The year in which the China patent is granted SIPO 
China patent grant 
lag*  
2.85 1.99 Number of years between a China patent application 
and grant 
SIPO 
China-U.S. patent lag*  1.61 2.64 Number of years between a U.S. patent application 
and its matching China patent dyad grant   
SIPO/ 
USPTO 
U.S. Patent Characteristics 
(8452 U.S. patents, 4226 associated with matching China patent dyads) 
Matching China patent 
dyad 
0.50 0.50 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if the U.S. patent is 
associated with a matching China patent dyad 
SIPO/ 
USPTO 
U.S. patent in force 0.58 0.49 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if citation is received in 
years after the U.S. patent grant year 
USPTO 
U.S. grant year 
window 
0.12 0.32 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if citation is received in 
the year of the U.S. patent grant 
USPTO 
U.S. patent application 
year 
2001 4.67 The year in which the U.S. patent application is made USPTO 
U.S. patent grant year 2004 4.94 The year in which the U.S. patent is granted USPTO 
Number of inventors 2.41 1.90 Number of inventors appearing on the U.S. patent  USPTO 
Number of classes  4.32 3.38 Number of national patent classes in the U.S. patent USPTO 
Number of claims 14.73 11.99 Number of claims made by the U.S. patent USPTO 
Number of patents in 
patent family 
8.89 29.36 Number of unique patents contained in the patent 
family of the U.S. patent 
USPTO 
Number of countries 
in patent family 
3.77 3.58 Number of unique countries represented by the 
patents in the patent family of the U.S. patent 
USPTO 
Biochemical sector 0.14 0.34 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if patent belongs to 
chemical, pharmaceutical or biotechnology related 




0.02 0.14 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if patent belongs to 
computing or information storage related classes   
USPTO 
R&D location in weak 
IPR provinces 
0.01 0.11 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if R&D for the patented 
technology is conducted in a Chinese province in the 
first quartile (lowest 25%) in IPR protection and 
enforcement: Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Shanxi, 
Hainan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou 
SIPO/ 
USPTO 
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Firm/ Organization Characteristics 
Firm 0.75 0.43 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 
the entities to which the patent is awarded is a 






University 0.06 0.23 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 
the entities to which the patent is awarded is a 





Research Institute 0.02 0.15 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 
the entities to which the patent is awarded is a 





Hospital 0.002 0.05 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 
the entities to which the patent is awarded is a 




Government 0.01 0.10 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 
the entities to which the patent is awarded is a 
central or state government agency, bureau, 




Individual 0.18 0.39 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if at least one of 





Based in China 0.29 0.44 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if the firm or 
organization to which the patent is assigned 
originates from/ is home based in China  
SIPO/ 
USPTO 
Based in U.S. 0.37 0.48 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if the firm or 
organization to which the patent is assigned 
originates from/is home based in the U.S. 
SIPO/ 
USPTO 
Total assets** 21.7 27.1 Total assets of the publicly traded firm owning 
the focal U.S. patent until the year of focal 
patent grant (in U.S. $ billions)  
Compustat 
Total sales** 32.3 25.9 Total sales of the publicly traded firm owning 
the focal U.S. patent in the year of focal patent 
grant (in U.S. $ billions) 
Compustat 
R&D spending** 0.93 1.66 Total R&D expenditure of the publicly traded 
firm owning the focal U.S. patent in the year of 
focal patent grant (in U.S. $ billions) 
Compustat 
Total number of 
patents* 
2498 7985 Total number of patents of the firm/organization 
which owns the focal U.S. patent over its 
lifetime (to end of 2008) 
USPTO 
Number of patents* 1529 6244 Cumulative number of patents of the firm/ 
organization which owns the focal U.S. patent 
until the end of year of the focal patent grant 
USPTO 
Developed China IPR 
weak  
0.33 0.47 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if half or more of 
the focal U.S. patent inventors are from China 
USPTO  
 
Developed U.S. IPR 
strong  
0.37 0.48 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if half or more of 




IPR strong  
0.12 0.33 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if half or more of 
the focal U.S. patent inventors are from 




0.50 0.50 Binary variable (1/0) set to 1 if half or more of 
the focal U.S. patent inventors are from 
non-U.S. countries with weak IPR regime   
USPTO 
* For the focal set of China-U.S. patent dyads. ** Information available for publicly traded firms only.  
   
34 
 
Table 2. Correlations of variables (employed in the regression models) 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Annual forward 
citation excluding 
firm self-citation 
1.00          
2 China grant year 
window 
-0.03 1.00         
3 China patent in force -0.04 -0.12 1.00        
4 U.S. grant year 
window 
-0.01 0.01 -0.02 1.00       
5 U.S. patent in force 0.12 -0.13 0.25 -0.43 1.00      
6 Matching China 
patent dyad 
-0.11 0.21 0.59 0.02 -0.01 1.00     
7 Number of inventors -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.03 1.00    
8 Firm 0.00 -0.01 -0.22 0.05 -0.13 -0.20 0.15 1.00   
9 University -0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.21 -0.25 1.00  
10 Research institute -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.23 -0.07 0.01 1.00 
11 Hospital 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 
12 Government -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.10 -0.13 0.01 0.04 
13 Individual 0.00 0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.17 -0.28 -0.80 -0.15 -0.10 
14 Number of classes 0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.13 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.05 
15 Number of claims 0.08 -0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.18 0.06 0.14 -0.01 0.02 
16 Number of patents in  
patent family 
0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.01 -0.01 
17 Number of countries 
in patent family 
0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.02 -0.01 
18 Based in China   -0.08 0.12 0.41 0.01 -0.04 0.57 0.12 -0.26 0.29 0.21 
19 Based in U.S.   0.10 -0.14 -0.37 -0.04 0.06 -0.59 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 
20 Biochemical sector -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.22 0.01 0.17 0.07 
21 Computing and 
information sector 
-0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
22 R&D location in 
weak IPR provinces 
-0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.10 0.11 -0.02 
 
  
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 Hospital 1.00           
12 Government -0.01 1.00          
13 Individual -0.02 -0.05 1.00         
14 Number of classes -0.01 0.00 -0.07 1.00        
15 Number of claims -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 1.00       
16 Number of patents in 
patent family 
0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.14 1.00      
17 Number of countries 
in patent family 
0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.13 0.11 0.41 1.00     
18 Based in China   0.03 -0.01 0.15 -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 1.00    
19 Based in U.S.   -0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.13 0.24 0.08 0.06 -0.49 1.00   
20 Biochemical sector 0.08 0.13 -0.12 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.06 1.00  
21 Computing and 
information sector 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 
22 R&D location in 
weak IPR provinces 
-0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.17 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 
All correlation coefficients with a magnitude of 0.01 or greater are significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of focal U.S. patents (patents each with a China patent dyad) 
versus control U.S. patents (patents not associated with China patent) 
  
Focal U.S. Patents Set 
(U.S. Patents Each 
Matched to a China 
Patent Dyad) 
Control U.S. Patents Set 
(U.S. Patents Not 
Associated with China 
Patent) 
Variable n Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Annual forward citation excluding 
firm self-citation 
33133 0.29 1.03 0.58 1.68 
Total forward citation  
excluding firm self-citation 
33133 3.93 10.13 7.47 16.07 
U.S. patent citation year 33133 2003 4.37 2003 4.37 
U.S. patent application year 4226 2001 4.68 2001 4.67 
U.S. patent grant year 4226 2003 4.84 2003 5.04 
Number of inventors 4226 2.41 1.99 2.41 1.81 
Number of classes  4226 3.91 2.89 4.73 3.76 
Number of claims 4226 12.45 8.32 17.01 14.41 
Number of patents in patent family 4226 7.18 8.36 10.60 40.60 
Number of countries in patent family 4226 3.91 3.10 3.63 3.99 
Biochemical sector 4226 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 
Computing and information sector 4226 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 
R&D location in weak IPR provinces 4226 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 4. List of strong and weak IPR countries (Adopted from Table 1, Zhao, 2006) 
Strong IPR Countries 
 

















































This list is compiled using eight indices and is reasonably stable over time (Zhao, 2006). Three from the general legal and 
political environment: The Law and Order index from the ICRG Risk Rating System (ICRG 1997), the O-Factor from the 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Opacity Survey (The Opacity Index 2000), and the Property Protection index from the Index of 
Economic Freedom (1995). Three indices on IPR protection: the Rapp and Rozek (1990) index, the Ginarte and Park (1997) 
index, and United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 Watch List from 1999. In addition, the Rule of Law index from 
Kaufmann et al. (1999, 2002) and the Piracy index from the annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study (BSA, 2000) 
prepared by the International Planning and Research Corporation are used. As these indices differ in their coverage of 
countries and time periods, weights are applied to obtain this reasonably stable list. For detailed construction and references, 
refer to Zhao (2006). 
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Table 5. Poisson models of the main effects of China patent grant  









Poisson: DV = annual forward citation  
excluding firm self-citation  




















































Independent Variables  












China patent in force 0.004  
(0.004) 












   0.49***  
(0.02) 
 N/A N/A 
Control Variables 





(0.01)   
0.99 
(0.01)  





(0.03)   
1.04  
(0.04)  





(0.07)   
1.07  
(0.10)  































(0.00)   
1.04***  
(0.01)  







(0.00)   
1.02*** 
(0.00)  











Number of countries 


















 3.57***  
(0.21) 
 






 4.22***  
(0.22) 
 
Patent fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
Patent citation year 
fixed effects 
Yes   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood  -67457 -60892 -33008 -21589 -11760 
Wald chi-square (p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of 
observations 
66268 66268 66268 66268 33133 33133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 6. Poisson models of the moderating effects of organizational base, technology sector 
and R&D location 
  Poisson: DV = annual forward citation excluding firm self-citation 




































in weak IPR 
provinces vs. 
R&D location 
not in weak 
IPR provinces  
interaction 
Independent Variable and Interactions 














China patent in force x 
Based in China   
1.46***  
(0.13) 
       
China patent in force x 
Not based in China 
0.94 
(0.07) 
      
China patent in force x 
Based in U.S.   
 0.83***  
(0.07) 
    
China patent in force x 
Not based in U.S. 
 1.19*** 
(0.04) 
    
China patent in force x 
Based in China   
  1.46***  
(0.05) 
   
China patent in force x 
Based in U.S. 
  0.83*** 
(0.07) 
   
China patent in force x 
Biochemical sector 
   0.89 
(0.09) 
   
China patent in force x 
Non-biochemical 
sector 
   1.15*** 
(0.04) 
  
China patent in force x 
Computing and 
information sector 
    1.58*  
(0.26) 
 
China patent in force x 
Non-computing and 
information sector 
    1.10***  
(0.04) 
 
China patent in force x 
R&D location in 
weak IPR provinces 
     1.52*  
(0.24) 
China patent in force x 
R&D location not in 
weak IPR provinces  
     1.10**  
(0.04) 
Control Variables 
Patent fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Patent citation year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Regression Statistics 
Log-likelihood -32984 -32997 -32981 -33004 -33007 -33007 
 
Wald chi-square(p)  0.00 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Number of  
observations 
66268 66268 66268 66268 66268 66268 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 2.  Timeline illustrating the relationship of a typical China-U.S. patent dyad and 


















with a high level  












    Boundary conditions 
Time Lapsed 
Application of China 
patent (before 
application of associated 





after the granting 
of China patent) 
 
Application of focal U.S. 
patent dyad (typically 
within 12 months after 
China patent application) 
 
Grant of China patent (average 
about 3 years after the application 
of the China patent, known as 
China patent grant lag) 
 
Follow-on U.S. patents application (citing focal U.S. patent application)  
 
Salience of signal 
H2: Patent is 
awarded to a 
China-based firm 
compared to a 
U.S.-based firm 
Lucidity of signal  




developed by firms 
in regions of lower 
de facto IPR 
institutional quality 
Nature of signal 
H3a/3b: Patent is 










H1: Granting of a 
patent to a focal 
firm under a weak 
IPR institution 
(China) serves as a 






by other firms under 
a strong IPR 
institution (U.S.)    
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Figure 4.  Estimated temporal impact of China patent grant on forward citations  
(Poisson vs. negative binomial regression models with patent fixed effects and 
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adoption by other 
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China patent grant event by external 
patent examiners – variations in the 
timing of grant for each patent dyad 
Average 3 years lag between 
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Post-China patent grant  
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